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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the potential of taxes and subsidies to aﬀect the creation and
success of venture capital backed new firms and the implications for economic welfare.
The background for studying these issues is the general interest in entrepreneurship and
the conditions for starting new firms. Entrepreneurship and the resulting new firms are
important for the wider economy because of the innovation processes going on in these
firms and the jobs and value which they create over time. The existence of a wide range of
policy initiatives reflects the high level of attention that policy makers and interest groups
devote to start-up firms. These programs are specifically intended to promote innovation
by encouraging investment in new firms. Many countries oﬀer special tax provisions
for small and medium-sized firms. Governments often subsidize lending to new firms
or provide direct subsidies to physical capital investment or research and development
expenditures. Still, the conditions facing potential entrepreneurs are continually being
debated, as is the question of whether politicians could and should do more to stimulate
firm creation.
A remarkable feature of the financing of new firms over the last couple of decades
is the increasing role of venture capital (VC). Data from the European Private Equity
and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) show that total funds raised by venture capital
companies as well as their investments have gone up significantly since the beginning of
the 1990s.1 While the stock market collapse in early 2001 aﬀected VC fund raising and
investment quite unfavorably, the drop in share prices for young technology firms over the
last couple of years did not bring back VC investments anywhere near the much lower
levels of ten years ago. Gompers and Lerner (2001) similarly present evidence of the
increasing role of VCs. They show (in their Figure 3) that VCs now stand for almost half
of all firms sold at IPOs (Initial Public Oﬀerings), in sharp contrast to the situation in
the 1980s, where the share of VC-backed companies at IPOs was below 10 per cent.
A further reason to take interest in the increasing role of VCs is that they correspond
1The data can be found under www.evca.com.
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quite closely to the agents in the literature on financial contracts. VCs and the entrepre-
neurs whose projects they finance and support, write often rather sophisticated, albeit
of necessity still incomplete, contracts. Hart (2001, p. 1088) acknowledges that the VC
sector is a good place to look for real-world counterparts of the implicit contracts studied
in the theory of financial contracts. According to Hart, the distinguishing feature of VC
deals is that the major participants enter a close relationship and are few in number. A
rather uncharted territory is how the contracts between entrepreneurs and VCs may be
aﬀected by taxes and subsidies that directly target young firm investment. But perhaps
taxes on mature firms that are not paid by start-ups, may be just as harmful as the
much debated capital gains tax on young firms. Taxes on mature firms are capitalized in
firm value which defines the price at which VCs and entrepreneurs are able to divest in
an initial public oﬀering or a trade sale. Obviously, these venture returns determine the
incentives to start a firm and add value in the start-up phase.
Thus we here pose the following question: How do taxes and subsidies aﬀect VC-
backed entrepreneurship and welfare? After a closer look at the phenomenon of venture
capital in section 2, section 3 sets up a simple two-period model which enables a study
of the influence of taxes levied on young or mature firms. Section 4 describes, mainly in
graphical terms, the eﬀects of taxes on the demand and supply of entrepreneurs and thus
venture capital. In addition, it demonstrates the qualitative eﬀects of the taxes on the
success and failure of new firms, on the rate of entrepreneurship and welfare. Section 5
concludes.
2 Venture Capital
In modelling VC backed entrepreneurship it is important to properly capture the nature
and role of VC.2 Gompers and Lerner (2001) define VC firms as independent, profession-
2For useful surveys of the VC literature see Gompers and Lerner (1999,2001), Kaplan and Stromberg
(2001), and Botazzi and DaRin (2002).
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ally managed pools of equity capital invested in high growth companies. VC firms are
typically created on the basis of funds raised from banks, pension funds, businesses and
private individuals and that are invested over a limited time span of about ten years on
average. VCs eventually exit the companies they invest in.
Most importantly, VCs are active investors as opposed to traditional loan financing
by banks. VCs concentrate on — and indeed have a comparative advantage in — financing
small high growth companies. A target firm is characterized by high potential, but also
high risk, as radical innovations are sought. The entrepreneur has a key role as supplier
of the basic business idea. Information problems abound: The entrepreneur has superior
knowledge about the prospects of further product development and the required eﬀort
she needs to put into the start-up. She typically has few assets and can thus oﬀer only
limited collateral, if any. Finally, she possesses only limited commercial experience and
know-how.
This is where the VC comes in. A VC has the entrepreneurial experience and industry
knowledge which the entrepreneur lacks. The VC has access to capital and to networks
of managers, customers, and suppliers. This professional expertise enables the VC to
support and advice the entrepreneur during the critical first phases of the new company’s
life.
VCs operate in a cycle. A VC first raises funds from the above-mentioned sources; the
funds are available for only a limited time period. Then the VC considers a host of possible
projects presented by would-be entrepreneurs, screens and selects a few for investment.
In selecting the start-ups, the VC assesses market potential and also the managerial
qualifications of the entrepreneur. Once a project is found worthwhile, a financial contract
between the VC and the entrepreneur stipulates the type of financial instrument used to
infuse capital into the firm and secure repayment. Typically, the instrument is equity-
like such as convertible debt, convertible preferreds, or straight equity. The contract may
stipulate that capital is made available only in several stages, with further capital injection
being conditional on certain performance targets. Finally, the contract specifies control
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rights: who can make what decisions under what circumstances.
Once a new firm gets going, the VC monitors its development, establishes key contacts
to customers, suppliers and outside professionals who may be hired to the firm. It provides
advice to the entrepreneur and the management team and altogether adds value to the
start-up. Due to the high risks involved, the fate of new companies diﬀers substantially.
The most successful ones can be sold at an IPO; the less successful, but still viable, at a
private trade-sale, whereas part of the investments must be written oﬀ completely. The
exit decision — when to get out of the new firm and in which way — is the final consideration
on the part of the VC.
A rather active research area in the US in recent years, the empirical analysis of
venture capital has by now provided substantial evidence of the diﬀerential eﬀects of VC
as compared to standard bank finance. For instance, Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) in
a couple of studies have examined VC backed firms and compared them to other firms
in Silicon Valley, controlling for possible selection eﬀects. They find that VCs generally
cause a significant and quantitavely important increase in the probabilities of first market
introduction; of hiring a sales or marketing director; of the use of stock option plans for key
employees; and of replacing the entrepreneur with an outside CEO. Moreover, VC-backed
firms produce more patents and more radical innovations than non-VC-backed firms.
Even though VC represents only a small part of financial intermediation, it accounts for
a significant part of economy wide innovation. Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that VC
backed firms are about three times as eﬀective in R&D as corporate firms. While VCs
only stand for some three per cent of total R&D spending, they contribute between eight
and fourteen per cent of innovation in the US.
So far, there are only very few empirical investigations of European VC. The study
by Botazzi and DaRin (2002) leaves the impression that VC is less developed and less
sophisticated in Europe than in the US, although the study by Audretsch and Lehmann
(2002) arrives at a somewhat more positive result. On the other hand, the US evidence
points to the perspective of sharpening the quality of European VC.
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Two pieces of evidence indicate the potential importance of tax and subsidy policies
in shaping entrepreneurship and activities within VC backed new firms. First, the EVCA
recently published the results of a major benchmarking analysis3, in which it evaluates
the environment of new firms and the conditions for entrepreneurship in a series of Euro-
pean countries. The analysis aims at explaining the type of tax and legal environments
in which entrepreneurship can flourish, as well as illustrating the current substantial di-
vergence between existing EU member states’ tax and legal rules. Among other things,
the report focuses on company tax rates in general and especially for small and medium-
sized companies (SMEs); capital gains taxes for individuals; tax incentives for individual
investors; and fiscal incentives to enhance research and development. The report argues
that a favourable tax environment for the VC industry involves lenient tax treatment
of capital gains on unquoted investments in growth companies; low company tax rates
especially for SMEs; and fiscal R&D incentives.
Second, the theoretical and empirical literature on entrepreneurship demonstrates that
taxes should and do matter. Boadway et al. (1991) examine the link between occupa-
tional choice, risk and taxes, and Gordon (1998) argues that the personal-corporate tax
diﬀerential should be important for the creation of innovative new firms. Fuest et al.
(2003) argue that diﬀerential corporate and personal taxes may be warranted to counter
adverse selection problems in new firms’ choice between debt and equity financing. Gen-
try and Hubbard’s (2001) empirical analysis demonstrates that the convexity of the tax
schedule is important for entrepreneurship. Cullen and Gordon (2003) find that lower
personal income taxes in fact reduce entrepreneurship because of the lower tax value of
oﬀsetting losses. The work of Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider and Rosen (as surveyed in Rosen
(2003)) produces ample evidence that once started, the decisions in new firms regarding
employment, capital investment and production are markedly influenced by taxes.
Public finance contributions regarding venture capital as such are so far limited. Gor-
don (1998) discusses the relation between profit sharing of entrepreneurs and VCs without
3See European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2003).
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incorporating the active role of VCs in new firms. Poterba (1989a,b) as well as Gompers
and Lerner (1998) investigate how capital gains taxation aﬀects the demand for VC via
entrepreneurs’ career choice and the supply of VC in terms of funds raised. Again, none
of these accounts for the value-adding capacity of VCs. This active role of VC will be key
in our analysis below.
Our own previous work has considered public policy towards venture capital in static
models. In Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003a) we focused on the relationship between moral
hazard, risk sharing and income taxes in venture capital contracts, while the eﬀects on
venture capital activity of capital gains taxes with full or limited loss oﬀset were dealt
with in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002, 2003b). Keuschnigg (2002) has analyzed the joint
role of a capital gains taxes and start-up subsidies in determining an optimal portfolio
of firms in VC financing. Keuschnigg (2003) examines the eﬀects of output subsidies to
mature firms with diﬀerentiated goods as well as entry subsidies to both entrepreneurs
and VCs on the equilibrium level of innovation. In the model below, we widen these
perspectives and apply a dynamic model in order to accomodate a full life cycle of firms
and relate the tax treatment of both young and mature firms to the incentives for VC
backed entrepreneurship.
3 A Model of Young and Mature Firms
3.1 Overview
We consider a two-period equilibriummodel of a closed economy with a population of mass
one. At the beginning of the first period, the government defines the policy environment.
Policy instruments include τ , a capital gains tax on new firms; z, a subsidy to physical
investment in start-ups; tD a tax on dividends on mature firms; and tG, a capital gains tax
on mature firms. Any surplus or deficit in the government budget is paid out or financed
with a lump-sum tax or transfer.
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Weighing the prospects of entrepreneurship against employment in a traditional sector,
individuals decide on occupation; some (E) become entrepreneurs in order to pursue
their business ideas, while the remainder (L = 1− E) become workers in the traditional
sector. An entrepreneur must first undertake a seed investment to turn her idea into
a project and develop a business plan. For this purpose, individual i needs to incur a
non-pecuniary investment of hi. At this stage, individuals are assumed to diﬀer in their
basic inventiveness. Some create their project at low cost while others have to put in more
eﬀort. Having undertaken the seed investment, an entrepreneur proposes a deal to a VC
firm to start up a firm. The contract assigns a share 1− s of possible revenues to the VC;
in return, the entrepreneur receives an up-front payment of B, and the VC also covers
the necessary physical investment of the start-up, I (reduced to I(1− z) on account of an
investment subsidy z).
After starting up the new firm, the investment is sunk, and both the entrepreneur and
the VC put in eﬀort to enhance the likelihood of success. We denote entrepreneurial eﬀort
by e and VC advice by a, and the likelihood of success is specified as p = p(e, a). If a
venture succeeds, it will be sold to new investors, possibly at an IPO, for a price V . If it
fails, the firm will be shut down without any production and revenues whatsoever. When
firms successfully mature to production stage, they produce f1 for the remainder of the
first period; in line with the ‘new view’ of dividend taxation, a part k of this production
is retained and invested internally to accumulate capital, while the residual f1− k is paid
out as dividends to owners.
In the second period, further production f(k) results. Revenues are paid out to owners
together with divestment of the undepreciated capital stock k. Workers receive their
income in the form of not only wages w, but also a share Π of profits in VC firms plus
government transfers T1 and T2 in the two periods. Instead of wages, entrepreneurs receive
the up-front payment B plus possibly a share sV of the revenue from selling a successful
firm. On top of this, they have to pay the capital gains tax on new firms τ , applicable to
both the up-front payment and possible venture returns. With income thus determined,
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individuals save in the first period to choose optimal life-cycle consumption. Below, we
lay out the most essential elements of our model.
3.2 Consumption and Savings
A particularly simple specification of preferences for present and future consumption, X i
and Di, is given by U i = X i + u (Di)− li, where li is the eﬀort of agent i, depending on
her occupation. Eﬀort of workers is normalized to zero. When consumption is decided,
eﬀort on the part of entrepreneurs is already sunk and income depending on success or
failure is given. Denoting by yi discounted individual income, intertemporal consumption
follows from
U∗i = max
½
Xi + u
¡
Di
¢
− li s.t. X i + 1
1 + r
Di ≤ yi,
¾
(1)
where r is the market rate of interest.
Ownership of VC firms is broadly dispersed over the population. VC profits are thus
divided equally and give rise to an income Π per capita. Agents are also entitled to a
present value of lump-sum per capita transfers T , or incur a tax liability if negative. At
the end of period 1, a worker has wealth (present value of income) yi = w + T + Π,
a successful entrepreneur yi = sV + B + T + Π, while a less fortunate one is left with
yi = B + T + Π only. Since preferences are assumed separable, the necessary condition
is u0 (D) = 1/ (1 + r), so that all agents demand the same amount of second period
consumption. Note here that D0 (r) > 0.
Desired intertemporal consumption is attained by an appropriate amount of savings
S. Since second period consumption is the same for all, savings must be identical as well.
Indirect utility follows from substituting out X i in (1),
U∗i = yi − li + C (r) , C (r) ≡ u (D)−D/ (1 + r) . (2)
Welfare of an individual agent equals life-time wealth adjusted for eﬀort cost plus consumer
surplus C which, by construction, is uniform across agents.
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3.3 Mature Firm Value and Investment
A mature firm is assumed to pay net of tax dividends of χ1 =
¡
1− tD
¢
(f1 − k) and
χ2 =
¡
1− tD
¢
(f (k) + k), where f1 is a fixed amount of first period production and
f (k) is a standard production function. This definition of dividends assumes internal
investment finance (f1 > k) and thus adopts the new view of dividend taxation. At IPO,
the value V of a mature firm reflects the present value of the net dividend flow χ1 and
χ2. Paying out a dividend χ1 at the end of period one leaves a value V2 at the beginning
of period 2. In period 2, another dividend of χ2 is paid out, leaving a value of V3 = 0 at
the end of the period, when the world ends. Therefore, from the date of IPO to the end
of period 2, dividend payments of mature firms run down their value to zero on account
of dividend payments and thereby produce negative capital gains. It is assumed that the
tax code allows for full tax rebates.
Taking account of capital gains taxes, no-arbitrage conditions nail down firm values
V and V2 in capital market equilibrium,
0 = χ1 +
¡
1− tG
¢
(V2 − V ) , rV2 = χ2 −
¡
1− tG
¢
V2. (3)
The first equation states that the sum of dividends and (negative) capital gains must
be zero in the latter part of the first period. During the second period, the dividends
and net-of-tax capital loss from owning shares in mature firms must add up to a rate of
return that matches the interest r from an alternative investment of V2. Substituting the
dividend definitions in these no-arbitrage conditions yields
V2 =
£¡
1− tD
¢
(f + k) /
¡
1− tG
¢¤
/ (1 + ρ) , V =
¡
1− tD
¢
(f1 − k) /
¡
1− tG
¢
+V2, (4)
where ρ ≡ r/
¡
1− tG
¢
is the discount rate or cost of equity. Thus, the mature firm’s
investment problem is to maximize
V =
1− tD
1− tG
∙
f1 − k +
f (k) + k
1 + ρ
¸
, (5)
yielding
f 0 (k) = ρ = r/
¡
1− tG
¢
⇒ dk
dr
< 0,
dk
dtG
< 0,
dk
dtD
= 0. (6)
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The eﬀects of taxes on mature firm investment clearly reflects the ‘new view’ of divi-
dend taxation. When investment is internally financed, as it mostly is with mature firms,
the dividend tax is neutral. More investment reduces dividends today, with corresponding
savings in the dividend tax, but raises dividends and dividend taxes due tomorrow. The
dividend tax thus reduces costs and returns of investment proportionally and is neutral
to investment. Since the capital gains tax raises the cost of capital, it reduces mature
firm investment.
Using the envelope theorem, the eﬀects of taxes on mature firm value are
(a) dVdr = −
V2
(1−tG)(1+ρ) < 0,
(b) dVdtD = −
V
1−tD < 0,
(c) dVdtG =
V
1−tG + ρ
dV
dr =
V+ρ·(V−V2)
(1−tG)(1+ρ) > 0.
(7)
Firm value is at a maximum at the IPO date and is subsequently run down to zero on
account of dividend payments, V > V2 > V3 = 0. Hence, mature firms generate capital
losses leading to tax rebates. Therefore, the first term in (7.c) stands for the increase in
firm value on account of higher tax rebates, when the capital gains tax is increased. The
second term is the reduction in firm value resulting from the fact that the tax raises the
discount rate. As the last equality shows, the tax rebates (in our model) dominate over
the discount rate eﬀect.4
3.4 VC Financed Start-ups
The simplest possible production structure in the first period is the following. Both
entrepreneurial and traditional firms produce the same good. Traditional firms produce
output with a Ricardian technology, where one worker produces one unit of output, giving
4This last result may, however, reflect our simple two-period formulation and may not come out as
strong in fully intertemporal models. In McGee’s (1998) extension of Sinn’s (1990) model of young and
mature firms with infinite planning horizon, the eﬀect of the capital gains tax on firm value is zero in a
steady state. This follows from evaluating McGee’s equations (2-3) in a steady state with V N = 0, and
diﬀerentiating with respect to the capital gains tax rate denoted by c in that paper.
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an aggregate output of L units. The ensuing wage equals one in equilibrium. Each
entrepreneurial firm, if it has successfully completed the start-up phase, produces f1 units
of the same good. Agents can opt for entrepreneurship or else choose employment in
a traditional firm. The occupational choice decision of individuals involves comparing
utility in (2) from entrepreneurship and employment, respectively.
An entrepreneur’s expected surplus is the diﬀerence in utility in these two alternatives,
and must in particular take account of various eﬀort costs. First, seed investment is inter-
preted as a non-pecuniary private research eﬀort which is required to prepare a business
plan. Agents are taken to be distributed uniformly in the unit interval with respect to
research ability and associated eﬀort cost, hi = h · i. Once this eﬀort is sunk, all start-up
firms are assumed to be of uniform quality which cuts out any issues of adverse selection
and helps to concentrate on the double moral hazard in VC backed firms.5
A start-up succeeds with probability p, leaving a value of V , and fails with 1 − p,
leaving nothing. By the law of large numbers with independent risks, the number of
mature firms becomes N = pE. The success probability p = p (e, a) is concave in joint
eﬀort with decreasing returns to eﬀort and is specified as
p = p (e, a) = eaα, + α < 1. (8)
VCs and entrepreneurs share expected firm value according to the following contractual
5We thus follow the finance literature in modeling the VC’s value added by making the firm’s success
jointly depend on the entrepreneur’s and VC’s eﬀort, subject to a double moral hazard. See Casamatta
(2003), Inderst and Mueller (2003), Repullo and Suarez (1999), and Schmidt (2003) for an incomplete
list. This is not to deny that selection eﬀects are important, but only helps to focus on the value added
role of VCs. See, however, Ueda (2003) on project selection of VCs. Selection problems are discussed
in the literature originating with DeMeza and Webb (1987) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), see De Meza
(2002) for a recent discussion. Fuest et al. (2003) study the relation between selection problems and
corporate vs. personal taxes.
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arrangement:
πE = (1− τ) [spV +B] ,
πF = (1− τ) [(1− s) pV −B − (1− z) I] ,
πG = τ [pV − (1− z) I]− zI,
π = πE + πF + πG = pV − I.
(9)
Recall that τ stands for the uniform capital gains tax on VCs and entrepreneurs, z is
a subsidy to start-up capital cost, πE, πF , πG are the expected incomes accruing to the
entrepreneur, the VC and the government. The governments surplus corresponds to the
net tax revenue extracted from the project, or the net subsidy injected. Note that VC
funds are owned households. The share of aggregate VC surplus per capita is denoted by
Π and fulfils Π = πFE.
Let eﬀort costs of the entrepreneur and the VC be given by βe and γa, respectively.
In assuming competitive VCs, we allocate all bargaining power to the entrepreneur. Ac-
cordingly, the VC’s surplus per venture, ΩF ≡ πF − γa, is squeezed to zero. Define the
entrepreneur’s profit net of eﬀort cost as ΩE ≡ πE−βe which is uniform by our symmetry
assumption. An entrepreneur’s surplus from incurring the seed investment and starting
a business is then ΩE − hi − w, as she must also take account of foregone wage income
and seed investment costs.6 Having sunk w+ hi, the entrepreneur is left to maximize her
remaining surplus subject to the VC choosing to participate and subject to optimal eﬀort
choice of both parties after the contract is signed. The problem is
ΩE = max
s,B
(1− τ) [p (e, a) sV +B]− βe s.t. (10)
PCF : ΩF = (1− τ) [p (e, a) (1− s)V −B − (1− z) I]− γa ≥ 0, (i)
ICE : ΩEe = pe (e, a) (1− τ) sV − β = 0, (ii)
ICF : ΩFa = pa (e, a) (1− τ) (1− s)V − γ = 0. (iii)
6The entrepreneur’s surplus reflects her occupational choice and, thereby, her willingness to start a
firm. When comparing expected welfare of the two career alternatives, all terms common to all occu-
pations such as Π + T and consumer surplus C fall out. Therefore, ΩE − hi − w gives the true utility
diﬀerential between occupations.
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At eﬀort stage, where the agreed profit share s is already fixed, optimal levels of eﬀorts
are determined by the two incentive compatibility constraints. Figure 1 illustrates the
simultaneous choice of eﬀort, using the functional form for p(e, a) above. Both reaction
curves e(a) and a(e) are positively sloped, implying that entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC
advice are strategic complements.
e
a
e
,s V ↑
a
( )e a
( )a e
τ ↓
,s τ←  V→
Figure 1: Eﬀort and Advice
Anticipating eﬀort choices, the entrepreneur proposes a deal such that the VC is willing
to finance the investment expenditure and support the project with advice. She oﬀers a
share 1− s in the firm at a total price covering the start-up cost plus an upfront payment
of B. The entrepreneur can thus raise her own expected profit by keeping either a larger
share s or demanding a higher upfront payment B by asking for a price in excess of
start-up cost (1− z) I. Note a fundamental diﬀerence between the two instruments s and
B. Claiming a higher s reduces the VC’s share and destroys her incentives to add value,
while the upfront payment B does not. The latter merely redistributes lump-sum across
the two parties. The entrepreneur will therefore first choose s to maximize joint surplus.
Having found this Pareto optimal share s, she then requests a maximum upfront payment
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B that allows the VC no more than to break even.7 In this way, the entrepreneur acquires
the entire joint surplus Ω = ΩE + ΩF . Substituting B from (10.i) into (10) yields the
entrepreneur’s problem for choosing s, anticipating the incentive eﬀects for later stage
eﬀort e and a as determined by (10.ii-iii) and illustrated in Figure 1:
Ω
∙
V
+
, τ
−
, z
+
¸
= max
s
(1− τ) [p (e, a)V − (1− z) I]− γa− βe s.t. (10.ii-iii). (11)
The entrepreneur first realizes a capital gain B when selling a stake to the VC at a price in
excess of start-up cost, and a possible additional gain sV at IPO.With a symmetric capital
gains tax on both entrepreneurs and VCs, the Pareto optimal profit share s becomes
independent of taxes and of venture returns V . We can thus take s as a fixed constant,
beyond the influence of policy.8
The joint surplus derived from the project must be suﬃciently large to compensate
entrepreneurs for any foregone outside opportunity w = 1, and an initial eﬀort cost
hi = h · i during the seed phase prior to VC finance. Entry of entrepreneurs occurs as
long as Ω−w−h · i > 0, until the marginal entrepreneur just breaks even. The free entry
condition is, thus,
Ω
∙
V
+
, τ
−
, z
+
¸
= w + hE. (12)
Figure 2 illustrates the relation between venture returns and the number of entrepreneurs.
A higher venture return V , consisting of a higher IPO value of a maturing firm, raises the
returns to start-up activity and leads more agents to choose an entrepreneurial career.
Already now, we can anticipate that a higher dividend tax, while harmless for mature firm
investment as predicted by the new view, may seriously impair start-up investment. In
reducing the IPO value of a mature firm, it reduces venture returns and thereby depresses
7This corresponds to the Pareto frontier in Inderst and Mueller (2003).
8In Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002) we show, though, that diﬀerential capital gains taxes on entrepre-
neurs and VCs, or a diﬀerent tax treatment of the upfront payment B, can change the privately optimal
equity share s, leading to more complicated comparative statics.
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start-up activity. This will be confirmed more rigorously below.
i
w
E
w h i+ ⋅
1
entrepreneurs workers
; ,V zτ ++ −⎡ ⎤Ω⎣ ⎦ V
opportunity
cost
Figure 2: The Start-up Decision
3.5 Equilibrium
We now derive equilibrium venture returns V by equating the demand and supply of new
firms. The demand for entrepreneurship reflects the demand for second period goods
which requires a suﬃciently large number N = pE of mature firms,
D = (f (k) + k) · pE. (13)
The success rate of start-ups is p(V, τ) since eﬀorts e, a are obviously functions of venture
returns and the capital gains tax on new firms (viz. 10.ii-iii) and Figure 1. By (6), mature
firm investment and output is a function of the interest rate which, in turn, is uniquely
related to the price V of successful new firms as in (5). Total diﬀerentiation of (5) allows
us to solve for the interest rate,
V2
1− tG
dr
1 + ρ
= −dV − V
1− tD dt
D +
(1 + ρ)V − ρV2
(1− tG) (1 + ρ)dt
G, r
∙
V
−
; tD
−
, tG
+
¸
. (14)
The supply per firm, f (k) + k, and total market demand D both depend on the interest
rate. Knowing the interest rate compatible with any given firm value, r (V ), we can thus
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derive the demand for entrepreneurs by inverting the second period equilibrium condition
in (13),
ED
∙
V
−
; tD
−
, tG
+
, τ
+
¸
=
1
p (V, τ)
· D (r)
f (k (r)) + k (r)
. (15)
The demand for start-up entrepreneurship is downward sloping in venture returns V ,
dED
dV
= −E
p
dp
dV
+
∙
E
D
D0 (r)− E
f + k
(1 + f 0) k0 (r)
¸
· r0 (V ) < 0. (16)
Since dp/dV > 0, D0 > 0, k0 < 0, and r0 < 0, all components contribute to the negative
impact of venture returns on the demand for start-up entrepreneurship. There are two
eﬀects. First, a higher firm value elicits more eﬀort and raises the success probability.
Other things equal, fewer start-ups E are needed, when a larger fraction of them matures
to production stage. Second, higher firm value reflects a lower interest rate. For any
given success rate, this depresses demand for second period output but raises investment
and output of mature firms. Consequently, fewer mature firms and thus fewer start-ups
are needed to accomodate demand. For both reasons, demand for start-up entrepreneurs
diminishes with venture returns as the downward sloping demand schedule in Figure 3
illustrates.
The supply schedule for new firms is upward sloping. Since an increase in venture
returns raises the entrepreneur’s surplus Ω, ever more entrepreneurs find it worthwhile
to incur the seed investment hi as illustrated in Figure 2. More formally, the free entry
condition (12) yields
ES
∙
V
+
; τ
−
, z
+
¸
, dES/dV =
1
h
· ∂Ω
∂V
> 0. (17)
Equating demand and supply for entrepreneurship, ED = ES, yields the equilibrium
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number of new firms, the IPO price V and, in turn, the interest rate r. Figure 3 illustrates.
E
V
E
V
 
; , ,D GDE V t t τ
− − + +
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦1
+ 
; ,SE V zτ
+−
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
Dt
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Venture Returns
With risk neutrality and no distributional concerns, welfare is the sum of individual
utilities and reflects eﬃciency. Utility in (2) includes monetary profits Π = πFE from
ownership of VC firms. Since these profits are merely a compensation for intangible VC
eﬀort costs γaE, we must subtract them from our welfare measure. The welfare criterion
is thus given by
U∗ =
Z E
0
U∗idi+ U∗LL− γaE. (18)
Noting the symmetry after the seed investment eﬀort helps to simplify. Utility of a worker
is U∗L = w + Π + T + C. Referring to (12) and noting symmetry after the seed phase,
utility of an entrepreneur is U∗i = U∗E + hE − hi. Utility of a low cost entrepreneur is
equal to utility of the marginal entrepreneur plus a rent reflecting her cost advantage in
generating a business idea. Since the marginal entrepreneur is indiﬀerent with respect
to occupational choice, U∗E = U∗L, and noting E + L = 1 as well as the participation
constraint of VCs, πF = γa, we can compute a simple welfare formula,
U∗ = w + T + C (r) +
Z E
0
¡
hE − hi
¢
di, C 0 (r) = D/ (1 + r)2 . (19)
The last term reflects entrepreneurial rent of low cost entrepreneurs. Further, consumer
rent from second period consumption increases with the interest rate.
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Now take the diﬀerential of (19) and use the definition of V2; the goods market equi-
librium (13); equations (17), (11) and (14) plus government balanced budget constraints.
The general expression for welfare changes from deviations from a zero-tax initial situation
can then be obtained:
dU∗ = (peV − β)Ede+ (paV − γ)Eda. (20)
The coeﬃcients in (20) would be zero if eﬀort and advice were chosen at their first best
levels which follow frommaximizing the joint surplus in (11) without incentive constraints.
Since eﬀorts are assumed not observable and not verifiable, neither the entrepreneur nor
the VC are able to commit to first best eﬀort but will choose their inputs according to the
incentive constraints (10.ii-iii). Since both agents must share the return on their eﬀort
within the team, but must fully bear their own cost, entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC advice
are too low in the private equilibrium.9 Thus, even small taxes can give rise to first order
welfare changes. Comparing with (10.ii-iii), the round brackets in (20) are both found
to be positive. They reflect the excess of social over private returns to eﬀort and advice.
Since privately chosen eﬀort tends to be underprovided in the presence of double moral
hazard, any policy that boosts eﬀort and advice must yield first order welfare gains.
It must be emphasized, however, that the VC industry has developed its own special
contractual instruments to alleviate such problems: the use of control rights, staged capital
infusions conditional on the firm reaching predefined milestones, and the use of convertible
securities. An analysis of these financing practices would require a more dynamic and
diﬃcult modeling of the relationship between entrepreneurs and VCs. Indeed, Schmidt
(2003) has shown that convertible securities can go a long way to allocate the right
incentives at the right time to the right party. However, Schmidt also acknowledges that
the incentive problem resulting from double moral hazard never fully disappears as long
as entrepreneurial eﬀort must be expended at the same time as VC advice. Given the
fact that most business failures can be traced in one form or the other to entrepreneurial
9Such incentive problems in teams have been first analyzed by Holmstrom (1982).
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management mistakes, it seems that the entrepreneurs’ eﬀort and due diligence is required
in each stage of business development.
4 The Eﬀects of Taxes
As mentioned in the Introduction, a recent EVCA benchmarking paper (cfr. EVCA
(2003)) has investigated the business climate for VC financed new firms in Europe, as-
sessing among other things the levels of corporate income taxes, especially for small and
medium-sized firms, capital income taxes for investment in new firms, and fiscal subsidies
to investment in start-ups. Clearly, the VC industry regards several taxes as possible
obstacles to VC financed start-up activity. It also seems to suggest that subsidies to loans
or to physical investments in new firms would be desirable. We will now demonstrate
that these measures may aﬀect VC backed start-up activity quite diﬀerently. We further
argue that a limited focus on the taxation of small firms cuts too short. The taxation of
mature firms might be as important for start-ups as the direct taxation of new firms. Sinn
(1991) and McGee (1998) already anticipate that dividend taxation can impair start-up
investment even though it is neutral with respect to mature firm investment under the
‘new view’. The key mechanism is that these taxes are capitalized in mature firm value
and thereby reduce venture returns.
The model set up in the previous section is well suited to study how selected taxes
and subsidies aﬀect the joint eﬀorts of entrepreneurs and VCs in new firms, the success
probability of these, the level of entrepreneurship, venture returns, and welfare. While
we can analyze the comparative static eﬀects more generally, we restrict our analysis to
small deviations from an untaxed market equilibrium and thereby avoid complicated tax
base eﬀects. Table 1 provides an overview of the main results. We emphasize intuitive
explanations of the main insights concerning the eﬀects of dividend taxation, capital gains
taxation, and subsidies to start-up investment.10
10For a more formal analysis of the proposed policy experiments, we refer the reader to a separate
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Table 1: Eﬀects of Tax Policy
Type of tax k E V e a U∗
mature firms
dividend tax tD + — — — — —
capital gains tax tG — + + + + +
young firms
capital gains tax τ + ± + — — —
start-up cost subsidy z — + — — — —
self-financing z, τ < 0 — ± — + + +
4.1 Dividend Taxation
The immediate eﬀect of an increase in the dividend tax on mature firms is to reduce
firm value. To see how this shifts demand for start-up firms ED for any given firm
value as in Figure 3, observe that the tax capitalization must be accompanied by an
oﬀsetting reduction in the interest rate to keep V constant (see (14)) which boosts mature
firm investment. A lower interest rate impairs demand for second period output, but
strengthens investment and output per firm. Consequently, fewer firms are needed to
satisfy demand. For any given V , the demand schedule shifts down in Figure 3 while
the supply schedule is unaﬀected. To eliminate the resulting excess supply of goods in
period 2, the interest rate must now rise again to create more demand and to reduce
supply, thereby partly reversing the initial reduction. A rising interest rate reduces firm
values. As can be inferred from Figure 1, lower venture returns discourage joint eﬀorts (the
reaction curves shift and give a new intersection within the lens). The success probability
declines and joint project surplus falls. Lower venture returns V thereby diminish the
incentives to start a business, as Figure 2 demonstrates.
According to Figure 3, the new equilibrium thus features less start-up entrepreneurship
and lower venture returns which, in turn, are detrimental to joint eﬀort and the success
mathematical appendix in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003c).
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probability. The net eﬀect on the interest rate is negative, giving rise to higher mature
firm investment as reported in the first line of Table 1. This is purely an equilibrium
eﬀect, since the tax was shown to be neutral in partial equilibrium, see (6). The key
impact on welfare derives from the fact that the dividend tax is capitalized into the
value of mature firms which discourages joint eﬀorts. Since entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC
advice are already too low in market equilibrium, the introduction of a small dividend
tax imposes a negative welfare eﬀect to the first order (cfr. (20) above). To state it more
provocatively, the dividend tax mostly harms those firms which actually do not pay any
dividends! We summarize:
Proposition 1 (Dividend Tax) (a) A higher dividend tax reduces firm value and start-
up entrepreneurship. (b) The reduction in firm value impairs incentives for entrepreneurial
eﬀort and advice and reduces the success probability. (c) Introducing a small dividend tax
on mature firms entails a first order welfare loss.
4.2 Capital Gains Taxation
The immediate eﬀect of a capital gains tax on young firms, given venture returns V , is
to subtract from returns to eﬀort and advice. As can be deduced from Figure 1, the
tax therefore discourages joint eﬀort. Further, the tax directly reduces the expected
capital gain from starting a firm. Both eﬀects subtract from the entrepreneur’s surplus
and thereby lead to exit. The supply schedule shifts down in Figure 3 (not drawn). On
the other hand, in discouraging eﬀort, the tax also reduces the success probability which
shifts up the demand curve. With a lower success rate, more entrepreneurs are required
to satisfy any given demand.
To reestablish equilibrium, venture returns must increase. The change in the num-
ber of start-up entrepreneurs, however, is ambiguous. Since higher firm values must be
supported by a lower interest rate (see again (14)), investment per mature firm expands
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in equilibrium. While the tax discourages joint eﬀort for any given return V , the equi-
librium increase in mature firm value sharpens incentives for eﬀort. However, it is easily
shown that this price adjustment cannot dominate over the direct tax eﬀect, implying
lower eﬀort and VC support in equilibrium and, hence, a lower success rate as well.11 By
(20), the reduction in entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC support leads to a welfare loss. We
summarize:
Proposition 2 (Capital Gains Tax on Start-up Firms) (a) A capital gains tax
raises firm value. The eﬀect on start-up entrepreneurship is ambiguous. (b) The tax
impairs incentives for eﬀort and advice and reduces the success probability. (c) Introducing
a capital gains tax on start-up firms entails a first order welfare loss.
A corollary of this proposition is, of course, that a small negative capital gains tax —
or revenue subsidy — for young firms will raise eﬀorts in start-ups and improve welfare.
However, a possible tax break in capital gains taxation must be limited to young VC
backed firms only. Table 1 shows that in our framework a capital gains tax on mature firms
at rate tG, being capitalized in a higher value of these firms, will raise venture returns and
hence welfare.12 Conversely, a capital gains tax relief to mature firms will be detrimental
to entrepreneurial eﬀorts and VC advice and will lower welfare.13 A general cut in the
capital gains tax is therefore not nearly as powerful in targeting eﬀorts and welfare as is
a selective tax break (revenue subsidy) to young VC backed firms exclusively.14
11Again, we refer to the mathematical appendix in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003c).
12Note that dividend payments of mature firms reduce their value down to zero in our two period
framework, leading to negative capital gains throughout their life. Allowing for full tax rebates, the
capital gains tax thereby boosts firm value.
13Throughout, we treat mature firm investment in accordance with the ‘new view’. This requires that
the tax treatment of retentions be no harsher than the tax treatment of dividends. Strictly speaking, an
increase from a zero-tax initial situation in the capital gains tax on mature firms would conflict with this
underlying assumption. On the other hand, a negative capital gains tax on mature firms would reinforce
the ‘new view’.
14Our result very much reflects the ambiguous simulation results of McGee (1998) with respect to
capital gains taxation.
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4.3 A Subsidy to Start-up Investment Cost
Most real world policies to encourage business formation allow for interest subsidies, loan
guarantees to facilitate access to cheaper bank loans, or direct subsidies to investment
spending. All these measures subsidize the cost of capital and are largely unrelated to
firm performance. They can thus be understood as a subsidy to the cost of start-up
investment, captured by z in our model. The only direct eﬀect of an increase in the
investment subsidy is to raise the entrepreneur’s surplus from starting the firm, see (11)
and (17), and thereby to encourage entry. There are no other direct eﬀects on eﬀort
and advice or on the demand for start-up firms. In Figure 3, the subsidy thus shifts up
the supply schedule and leads to a new equilibrium with more entrepreneurs and lower
venture returns. The adjustment mechanism is well known by now. Since lower firm value
reflects a higher interest rate, the subsidy retards mature firm investment, see Table 1.
The undesirable side eﬀect of start-up subsidies is that they impair incentives for
entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC advice. The success probability correspondingly declines.
The more successful these subsidies are in stimulating entry, the more likely should be
the decline in venture returns, and the stronger the negative welfare consequences. Note,
however, that this welfare loss results from a general equilibrium eﬀect rather than any
direct impact. In a small open economy with a fixed real interest rate, mature firm value
should remain constant. In this case, eﬀorts would be unaﬀected, and the subsidy would
only produce increased entry. Since the entry margin is not distorted, the subsidy would
entail a zero welfare eﬀect in this case.
We have thus established, for a closed economy:
Proposition 3 (Capital Subsidy to Start-ups) (a) A subsidy to start-up capital cost
expands entrepreneurship and reduces venture returns. (b) The subsidy impairs incentives
for eﬀort and advice and reduces the success probability. (c) Introducing a small subsidy
to start-up cost entails a first order welfare loss.
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As a corollary, a tax on start-up capital cost could raise welfare, if the general equi-
librium eﬀects are noticeable. This can be compared to DeMeza and Webb (1987) who
argue, for entirely diﬀerent reasons, that entrepreneurial entry should be discouraged.
4.4 A Self-financing Policy
The fact that a start-up subsidy and the capital gains tax both reduce welfare suggests the
following strategy. Impose a tax z < 0 on start-up investment cost and use the proceeds
to finance a narrow tax break τ < 0 on capital gains to young VC backed firms. Since
the entrepreneur is wealth constrained, the start-up tax must be paid by the VC who
should have no diﬃculty in raising capital. Being self-financed, the policy provides a net
tax or subsidy equal to zero. The government budget constraint with all other taxes at
zero reads τ (pV − (1− z) I)E = zIE in this case. A small start-up tax thus finances a
cut in the capital gains tax rate by (pV − I) dτ = Idz.
We first investigate the direct impact for a given value V . The direct eﬀects on
entrepreneurial surplus from the investment tax and from the revenue subsidy exactly
cancel out on account of revenue neutrality. However, the tax break on τ strengthens
incentives, thereby boosting joint eﬀort, see Figure 1, and increases the success rate as
well. As a result, the project surplus increases and encourages entry of entrepreneurial
firms. The supply schedule in Figure 3 shifts up. At the same time, the tax cut τ
reduces the demand for entrepreneurship, for any given V , because it makes start-ups
more successful by inducing more eﬀort, see (15). Fewer firms are needed to satisfy goods
demand if more of them mature to the production stage. The demand schedule shifts
down. Drawing this scenario in Figure 3 clearly shows that venture returns start to fall,
thereby stimulating demand but discouraging supply of entrepreneurs. The equilibrium
eﬀect on entrepreneurship remains ambiguous. The reduction in firm value reflects a
higher interest rate which is detrimental to mature firm investment, see Table 1.
Although the diminished venture returns work to erode entrepreneurial eﬀort and VC
advice, this adjustment does not dominate the stimulating impact of the tax cut. It is
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easily shown that net venture returns (1− τ)V increase. Accordingly, the self-financing
policy stimulates joint eﬀort in equilibrium as well. Again from (20), this brings about
an improvement in welfare.15 We summarize:
Proposition 4 (Self-financing Policy) (a) A capital gains tax cut financed with a tax
on start-up capital cost reduces venture returns while the eﬀect on entrepreneurship is
ambiguous. (b) Since the value of mature firms net of the capital gains tax increases,
the policy encourages eﬀort, advice and the success probability. (c) A small policy change
entails a first order welfare gain.
This important proposition implies that potential incentive problems in VC financed
start-up firms do not justify any big subsidies to the VC industry. Since the proposed
policy is self-financing, the net subsidy per project is zero! Our framework essentially
implies that public policy should not aim at more, but at more successful VC backed
firms. This conforms quite well with the conclusions of Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) about
VC in Europe. They argue that in Europe VC has expanded quite impressively over the
last decade, but the impact on firm performance seemingly remained rather limited. If
anything, this calls for a policy that sharpens incentives for more entrepreneurial eﬀort
and more active VC involvement. In our framework, the entry margin is undistorted, but
the double moral hazard between entrepreneurs and VCs works to erode incentives for
value creating eﬀort.
5 Conclusions
The creation of young entrepreneurial firms has been in the spotlight of policy makers and
economists. New firms are considered an important source for new jobs, innovation and
growth. Since VC is associated often with the most successful of the new firms and many
15Note that the policy would work even better in an open economy where any adjustment in the interest
rate and mature firm value is limited.
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of today’s leading technology companies have started out with VC support, VC backed
start-up activity catches particular interest. As a consequence, policy makers and industry
representatives have been much concerned whether the conditions for VC financing and
starting up new firms are appropriate, see European Commission (1998, 2000, 2003) or
EVCA (2003). The decision to embark on an entrepreneurial career and to allocate funds
to start-up investing depends on many factors. This paper argues that tax policy holds
an important potential to aﬀect not only the number, but also the success and growth of
VC financed new firms.
In practice, the policy initiatives intended to stimulate VC backed start-up activity
mostly allow for various subsidies to the cost of capital such as subsidized loans, credit
guarantees to facilitate access to cheap bank loans, favorable depreciation rules, or direct
subsidies to R&D and start-up investment spending. In the realm of taxes proper, the
capital gains tax is usually considered as particularly damaging to VC activity. The main
policy conclusions of this paper are that a tax relief on capital gains is more beneficial
than a subsidy to start-up cost. While a subsidy on start-up cost is clearly eﬀective in
encouraging entry, it is not performance-related and therefore ill-suited to strengthen in-
centives. A tax relief, in contrast, succeeds to strengthen incentives for value-creating
eﬀort and thereby makes firms more successful. Another lesson is that looking at taxes
directly levied on young firms cuts too short in fully defining the tax environment for
start-up investment. The average tax burden on mature firms is capitalized in firm value
and thereby reduces venture returns which drive the discrete investment choice by start-
up firms. This is most clearly demonstrated by the dividend tax. According to the ‘new
view’, the dividend tax is fully neutral with respect to capital accumulation of mature
firms. However, it clearly reduces firm value on account of tax capitalization and thereby
discourages start-up entrepreneurship as part of the economy-wide investment. By reduc-
ing venture returns, it also discourages eﬀort and VC support and thereby contributes to
a higher rate of business failure. To put it more provocatively, the dividend tax harms
mostly those firms which actually don’t pay the tax.
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On the normative front, the model proposed in this paper identifies a market distor-
tion in VC backed start-up investment and thereby justifies, in principle, some form of
government action. However, what is required in our model is not more firms, but more
successful ones. The appropriate policy thus is not simply to throw more money at start-
ups, but instead to restructure tax and subsidy policies to make them more performance
related. This could be achieved by reducing the existing subsidies to start-up capital cost
which are largely unrelated to success, and channel the resulting budget savings towards
selective tax cuts for young, VC backed firms, where the incentive problems from double
moral hazard are the largest. This should strengthen the incentives for entrepreneurial
eﬀort and closer VC involvement in start-up firms.
Future research on the taxation of young, venture capital backed firms might address a
number of extensions. First, one might consider more formally the innovative spillovers of
start-up firms and what they imply for innovation in new firms compared to innovation in
established firms. As Boadway and Tremblay (2003) argue in their survey, such knowledge
spillovers do not necessarily justify entry subsidies because of a business stealing eﬀect.
On the other hand, the empirical literature seems to suggest that young VC backed firms
are more eﬀective in R&D and pursue more radical innovations than established ones.
Second, the influence of taxes on the specific contractual arrangements typically used in
VC financing is a rather unexplored area. To what extent is the VC industry able to
fully overcome the incentive problems in VC backed start-ups by using control rights,
convertibles, staging etc. in addition to cash flow rights? What is the influence of taxes
on contractual arrangements and investment decisions with such richer forms of financial
contracting? Finally, it would be fruitful to consider the coexistence and interaction of
bank and VC financing of start-ups. This research might possibly emphasize the way in
which banks and VCs select projects, and how this aﬀects the value creating activity of
VCs in the subsequent start-up phase.
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